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NON-TRADE AND NON-BUSINESS EXPENSE
DEDUCTIONS:
SECTION 23(A)(2) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE

R. J;V. Nahstollt

A

MONG the innovations introduced into the Internal Revenue
Code by. the Revenue Act of 1942 was the provision allowing
deduction from gross income, in the computation of net income, of nontrade and non-business expenses. Every revenue act including the Act
of 1894, has provided in one form or another for the deduction of
trade and business expenses.1 Prior to the 1942 amendment, the relevant provisions of section 23 of the code read as follows:
"Deductions from gross income. In computing net income
there shall be allowed as deductions:
(a) Expenses.

* The writer is indebted to Professor Paul G. Kauper of the University of Michigan Law School for his helpful suggestions and criticisms.
LL.B., University of Michigan; member of bars of the States of Michigan and
Oregon.
1
Act of 1894, 28 Stat. L. 509 at 553, § 28, respecting individuals: "The necessary expenses actually incurred in carrying on any business, occupation, or profession
should be deducted .•••" Act of 1913, 38 Stat. L. II4 at 167, § II.B: "That in
computing net income for the purpose of the normal tax there shall be allowed as
deductions: First, the necessary expenses actually paid in carrying on any business, not
including personal, living or family expenses, ••••" Act of 1916, 39 Stat. L. 756,
§ 5 (a): First, as to individuals and § 12(a): First, as to corporations, reenacted provisions of Act of 1913; Act of 1917, 39 Stat. L. 1000 at 1001, § 205; War Revenue Act
of 1917, 40 Stat. L. 300; Act of 1918, 40 Stat. L. 1057, § 214(a)(1); Act of 1921,
42 Stat. L. 227 at 239, § 214 (a) (1), amended provision of Act of 1918 to include
travelling expenses. Act of 1924, 43 Stat. L. 253 at 269, § 214(a) (1); Act of 1926,
44 Stat. L. 9 at 26, § 214(a) (1); Act of 1928, 45 Stat. L. 795 at 799, §" 23(a);
Act of 1932, 47 Stat. L. 169 at 179, § 23(a); Act of 1934, 48 Stat. L. 680 at 688,
§ 23(a); Act of 1936, 49 Stat. L. 1648 at 1658, § 23(a); Act of 1938, 52 Stat. L.
447 at 460, reenacted§ 23(a) of Act of 1928 as§ 23(a)(1) and added§ 23(a)(2)
allowing deduction of corporate charitable contributions.
Mr. Magill suggests that business deductions were allqwed by the commissioner
under the Act of 1862, though the provision therein covered only taxes. MAGILL,
TAXABLE INCOME 336 (1936).

t
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( 1) In general. All the ordinary and necessary expenses paid
or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or
business, including a reasonable allowance for salaries or other
compensation for personal services actually rendered; traveling
expenses (including the entire amount expended for meals and
lodging) .while away from home in the pursuit of a trade or business; and rentals or other payments required to be made as a
condition to the continued use or possession, for purposes of the
trade or business, of property to which the taxpayer has not taken
or is not taking title or in which he has no equity:
( 2) Corporate Charitable Contributions.••."
This provision lent itself to judicial moulding in construction of the
phrase, ·"carrying on a trade or business," and it was the Supreme
Court's rigid interpretation thereof that led to adoption of the present
section 23(a)(2), which allows deduction of non-trade and nonbusiness expenses.
The 1941 case of Higgins 'V. Commissioner 2 was the immediate
force motivating Congressional action, but at least three other cases
must be inspected for their contribution.3 In Van Wart 'V. Commissioner, the taxpayer was a minor and beneficiary of a trust created by
the will of her grandfather. As guardian of the taxpayer, her father
brought suit to enforce his demands that the trustees pay over to the
taxpayer accumulated income and future income as it annually accrued. Attorneys' fees for services in the litigation were paid in l 924.
The Supreme Court affirmed the reversal of a holding by the Board
of Tax Appeals that such fee was deductible as an ordinary and necessary- expense in carrying on business, under the Act of 1924. After
finding that the ward, not the guardian, was the taxpayer, and that
"the attorney's fee arose out of litigation conducted in the name of the
ward" and that it "was paid for her benefit out of her income," the
Court said, simply, "The ward was not engaged in any business. So
far as appears the same thing is true of the guardian." 4
There followed the· Higgins case, brought under the Act of 1932.
Taxpayer had been for over thirty years engaged in the large scale
business of realty investments and investments in stocks and bonds.
From his home in Paris, he kept in personal touch with his New York
2

312 U.S. 212, 61 S.Ct. 475 (1941), rehearing den., 312 U.S. 714, 61 S.Ct.
728 (1941).
3
Van Wart v. Commissioner, 295 U.S. u2, 55 S.Ct. 660 (1935); United
States v. Pyne, 313 U.S. 127, 61 S.Ct. 893 (1941); City Bank Farmers Trust Co.
v. Helvering, 313 U.S. 121, 61 S.Ct. 897 (1941).
4
295 U.S. 112 at u5-u6, 55 S.Ct. 660 (1935).
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office by cable, telephone and mail. His personal activity in the management of each of the two sides of his business was substantial. The
work was carried on by large staffs which followed regular business
practices. It was conceded that the real estate activities constituted a
"business" but the Supreme Court, affirming the circuit court of appeals
and the Board of Tax Appeals, ruled that the management of the
taxpayer's own investments, "no matter how large the estate or how
continuous or extended the work required may be," 5 did not as a
matter of law constitute the carrying on of a business. 6 In support of
this denial, the Court rested its conclusion "upon a conception of carrying on business similar to that expressed by this Court, for an antecedent
section [2r4(a) of the Act of r924]" and cited in support thereof only
the Van Wart case. The latter, we have seen, merely stated the bald
conclusion that "the ward was not engaged in any business." Moreover, it would seem doubtful, at best, that the continuous, active management of the taxpayer's own investments for the purpose of producing income (Higgins case) should have been found analagous to the
sporadic litigation brought merely to force delivery of income (Van
Wart case).
The Pyne and City Bank Farmers Trust Co. decisions followed
within three months. In the latter case 7 the Court denied deduction
from the gross income of a trust, the corpus of which was stocks and
bonds, of commissions paid to a trustee charged with the duties of
applying a sufficient portion of the trust income to the education and
support of the beneficiary and accumulating the surplus income until
majority of the beneficiary at which time it was to be paid over, the
corpus to be continued in trust for the beneficiary and his descendants.
The trustee's activities were limited to reviewing the stocks and bonds
in trust, several times a year; selling securities and re-investing the
proceeds in other stocks and bonds; collecting interest and dividends on
5

Previous cases had employed the test of the scale and continuous nature of
the taxpayer's activity in his own investments and had found them sufficiently extensive
to constitute a "business." Kales v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 6th, 1939) IOI F. (2d)
3 5; Harvey H. Ostenberg, I 7 B.T.A. 73 8 ( I 929) [ Question of deductions for losses,
under§ 204(b) of the Act of 1921]; C. W. Stimson, 22 B.T.A. 26 (1931) (same);
Austin B. Barney, 36 B.T.A. 446 (1937) [under § 23(a) of the Act of 1928];
Cornelia W. Roehling, 37 B.T.A. 82 (1938) [under§ 23(a), Act of 1928]. Other
cases, applying the test and holding against the taxpayer were: Bedell v. Commissioner,
(C.C.A. 2d, 1929) 30 F. (2d) 622, [question of offsets of losses under § 204(b),
under Act of 1918]; Kane v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 2d, 1938) 100 F. (2d) 382,
[under§ 23(a) of Act of 1928].
6
312 U.S. 212 at 218, 61 S.Ct. 475 (1941).
7
The City Bank Farmers Trust Co. case arose under the Act of 1928.
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securities; keeping account books for the trusts and rendering statements to the interested parties; preparing and filing income tax· returns; and distributing income to the beneficiaries.
The Supreme Court held justifiable the summary of the Board of
Tax Appeals that
" 'The above facts demonstrate conclusively to us that this is
a case of passive investment and not of carrying on a business,
for not only is the trustee limited in its investments, but is cautioned in e:ffect to be a safe investor rather than a participant in
trade or business, and, plainly carrying out the testator's injunctions, it conducts no business, because it has, as above seen, no
expenses of conducting business other than the collection of coupons and mailing bonds, amounting to a few dollars, and an even
more negligible amount for transfer stamps or notary fees.' " 8
In stating this_ flagrant non sequitur, the board apparently disregarded the cost of highly trained business acumen. The Supreme
Court, sustaining the board's conclusion, held that "the instant trusts
were not 'business trusts' but existed merely to hold and conserve
property and distribute the income received." 9
Thus, management of securities held on trust for another, like
management of one's own securities, was denied the status of a "business."
The Pyne case 10 resulted in the Supreme Court's vacating a judgment of the Court of Claims based on recognition by the latter that
the executor of a large estate was engaged in a "business." The Supreme Court held such a finding unjustified, though the estate was
being continued much as it had been handled during the life of decedent who, prior to his death, " 'was engaged in business as a financier
and investor, maintaining an office where he employed an office manager and an average of six clerks. . . .' " 11 The executor's operations
were held to be a continuance of financial and investment activities
similar to those denied deduction in the Higgins case. While the
Court conceded that it is not impossible for an executor to be actively
engaged in carrying on a "business," it held that, "it cannot be said as
a matter of law that an executor comes into this category merely because he conserves the estate by marshalling and gathering the assets
as a mere conduit for ultimate distribution." 12
8

313 U.S. 121 at 125, note 3, 61 S.Ct. 896 (1941). (Italics supplied.)
Id. at 125, note 4.
10
The Pyne case arose under the Act of 1934.
11
313 U.S. 127 at 129, 61 S.Ct. 893 (1941).
12
Id. at 132.
9
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These decisions impelled Congress, on the recommendation of the
Treasury Department,13 to amend section 23(a)(2), by the following
provision for deduction of non-trade and non-business expenses in the
1942 Act:
"Non-trade or non-business expenses.-In the case of an
individual, all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year for the production or collection of
income, or for the ·management, conservation, or maintenance of
property held for the production of income." 14
Important in the construction of section 23(a)(2) is the issue of
its relation to section 23 (a) (I). A suggestion of Congressional intent
that the newer section be accorded a construction paralleling section
23 (a) (I) has been found in the following statement:
"Expenses, to be deductible under section 23 (a) ( 2), must be
ordinary and necessary, which rule presupposes that they must be
reasonable in amount and must bear a reasonable and proximate
relation to the production or collection of income, or to the management, conservation, or maintenance of property held for that
purpose.
"A deduction under this section is subject, except for the requirement of being incurred in connection with a trade or business,
to all the restrictions and limitations that apply in the case of the
deduction under section 23(a)(1)(A) of an expense paid or incurred in carrying on any trade or business." 15
13
See testimony of Mr. Randolph Paul before the House Committee on Ways
and Means, I Hearings Before Committee on Ways and Means on Revenue Revision
of 1942, 77th Cong., 2d sess., p. 88 (1942).
14
56 Stat. L. 798 at 819, § 121. In the form adopted, the section was § I 18 of
the original H.R. Bill 7378, 77th Cong., 2d sess., introduced July 14, 1942.
15
H.R. Rep. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d sess., p. 75 (1942). S. Rep. 1631, 77th
Cong., 2d sess., p. 88 (1942). This language has been incorporated into TREAS. REG.
I I 1, § 29.23 {a)-15. This parallel construction finds support in Lumpkin v. Bowers,
(D.C. S.C. 1943) 50 F. Supp. 874 at 876, wherein the court quotes from Welch v.
Helvering, 290 U.S. I I I at 114, 54 S.Ct. 8 (1933), defining the phrase as used in
§ 23 (a)( I): "'Ordinary in this context does not mean that the payments must be
habitual or. normal in the sense that the same taxpayer will have to make them often.
A lawsuit affecting the safety of a business may happen once in a lifetime. The
counsel fees may be so heavy that repetition is unlikely. Nonetheless, the expense is
an ordinary one because we know from experience that payments for such a purpose,
whether the amount is large or small, are the common and accepted means of defense
against attack.'" The case was reversed on other grounds in Bowers v. Lumpkin,
(C.C.A. 4th, 1944) 140 F. {2d) 927, cert. den., 322 U.S. 755, 64 S.Ct. 1266
(1944); 151 A.L.R. 1340 (1944). The circuit court said, "Hence it may not be
doubted that Congress, in amending§ 23 of the Internal Revenue Code by the Revenue
Act of 1942, used the phrase, 'all the ordinary and necessary expenses' under the
caption 'Non-Trade or Non-Business Expenses' in the same sense and with the same
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But what appears to be the better interpretation is not the parallel one.
McDonald v. Commissioneri 6 involved the deductibility of campaign expenses, including a substantial contribution to the party "warchest," incurred by the petitioner who had been appointed to a Pennsylvania court to complete an unexpired term on the understanding that
he would contest the next primary and general elections. The majority
of the Court 11 denied the deductions under section 23 (a) ( 2) on the
stated theory that in enacting section 121 of the 1942 Act, Congress.
purposed
" ... to afford relief for a specifically defined inequitable situation which has become manifest by the decision of the <:;:ourt in
Higgins v. Commissioner. .• _is In that case, this Court held that by
previous enactments Congress had made no provision for allowable deductions from profitable transactions not covered -by the
statutory concept of 'business' income." 19
Moreover, said the Court, under section 48(d) of the code the
performance of the functions of a public office was treated as a "business" so the expenses connected therewith could not be deducted under
section 23(a)(2). Further, "legislative history" pointed to disallowance of the deduction as a business expense under section 23 (a) (I).20
"The amendment of I 942 merely enlarged the category of
incomes with reference to which expenses were deductible. It did
limitations that it had previously used in connection with trade and business expenses."
Id. at 929. In regard to what business expenses are "ordinary and necessary" within
meaning of income tax laws permitting deductions, see Annotation 84 L. Ed. 426.
Since what is "ordinary and necessary'' constitutes a pure question of fact to be
determined in the commonly accepted meaning of the words, according to Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467, 64 S.Ct. 249 (1943), decided the same day as
Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489, 64 S.Ct. 239 (1943), it is unlikely that the
Tax Court's determinations of this question will be disturbed on appeal. Cf. Bingham's
Trust v. Commissioner, 325 U.S. 365, 65 S.Ct. 1232 (1945), especially the concurring opinion- of Justice 'Frankfurter. See note 27, infra. Compare also Commissioner v. Wiesler, (C.C.A. 6th, 1947) 161 F. (2d) 997, affg. 6 T.C. 1148 (1946),
dealing with status under the Dobson rule of Tax Court's finding that a busin,ess
expense is "ordinary and necessary'' within § 23(a) (1).
16
323 U.S. 57, 65 S.Ct. 96 (1944).
17 Opinion by Justice Frankfurter. Chief Justice Stone and Justices Roberts and
Jackson concurred in the opinion; Justice Rutledge concurred only in the result.
18
312 U.S. 212, 61 S.Ct. 475 (1941). For disposition of a case similar to the
Higgins case since the 1942 Act, see Milner v. Commissioner, T.C. Dkt. 107151,
108673, 1 T.C. 1215, 1943 P-H MEMO. DEc., 1f 43,055.
19
323 U.S. 57 at 61, 62, 65 S.Ct. 96 (1944).
20
An annotation collecting cases considering deductibility of campaign expenses
prior to the 1942 Act is found in 155 A.L.R. 128 (1945).
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not enlarge the range of allowable deductions of 'business' expenses." 21
A more liberal, and more convincing view of section 121 is found
in the dissent of Mr. Justice Black.22 It asserts:
"The language it [Congress] utilized was certainly far broader
than was required to meet the narrow problem presented by the
Higgins case. Congress specifically disposed of the Higgins problem by allowing a deduction for the expenses incurred in ' ... the
management, conservation or maintenance of property held for
the production of income.' Had Congress simply enacted those
words, and nothing more, it might properly have been inferred
that it intended to grant the type of deduction denied in the Higgins case, and no other. But it provided an additional deduction,
in the very same section, for expenses incurred 'in the production
. . . of income.' " 28
The argument in favor of parallel construction is recognized, but
its limitations respected, in the following words taken from the dissent:
"Before the 1942 Act, an expense to be deductible had to be
'ordinary and necessary' in its relation to the taxpayer's business;
under the new section it need only be 'ordinary and necessary'
in its relationship to the taxpayer's efforts to produce income.
Hence, while the words 'ordinary and necessary expenses,' defining permissible deductions, remained unchanged in the new section, they were given added content in their new relationship ....
Since the enactment of the new section, the two questions essential to determination of deductibility are: Were the expenses incurred in an effort to produce income? Were these expenses, or
part of them, 'ordinary and necessary' in connection with that effort?" 24
21

323 U.S. 57 at 62, 65 S.Ct. 96 (1944).
With whom Justices -Reed, Murphy and Douglas concurred.
28
323 U.S. 57 at 67, 65 S.Ct. 96 (1944).
24
Id. at 66. The McDonald case is criticized in Diamond, "The Shadow of
McDonald v. Commissioner," 16 PA. B.A.Q. 293 (1945) [reprinted in 23 TAXES
5II (1945)]; 13 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 489 (1945); 19 TENN. L. REv. 92 (1945).
But, in Low v. Nunan, (C.C.A. 2d, 1946) 154 F. (2d) 261 at 264, a:ffg. T.C. Dkt.
2190, 1944 P-H MEMO. DEc., 1f 44,277, deduction of telephone toll charges, railroad fares, entertainment expenses was disallowed under § 23(a)(2). The court said,
''We think that none of the expenditures was 'ordinary.' We believe that § 23 (a)(2)
must be read in the light of Deputy v. DuPont [308 U.S. 488, 493-494, 60 S.Ct.
363 (1940) ], although it was decided before the 1942 amendment which added
§ 23 (a)(2).''
22
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The subsequent case of Bingham's Trust v. Commissioner 25 suggests a liberalism more in harmony with the dissent in the McDonald
case. Involved were questions of the deductibility by trustees of a
testamentary trust of three items of expense: (I) payment made by
trustees for legal services· in litigation in which they sought to establish
that the appreciation in value of securities turned over to the legatee
did not represent a gain taxable to the estate; ( 2) fees for legal services in connection with the annual payment by the trustees during the
continuance of the trust; (3) fees and expenses for attorneys' services
in respect to tax and other problems arising upon the expiration of the
trust and relating to the final distribution of the trust fund among the
residuary legatees.
. Under a rigid interpretation of section 23 (a) ( 2), the circuit court
of appeals reversed the Tax Court and disallowed the deductions. 26
The Supreme Court, ~eversing the circuit court, recognized the doublebarrelled character of the section 27 and denied "merit in the [circuit]
court's conclusion that the expenses were not deductible because they
were not· for the production of income.'" 28 The Court ruled that the
property while held for distribution was nevertheless so held pursuant
25
325 U.S. 365, 65 S.Ct. 1232 (1945), reversing Commissioner v. Kenan,
(C.C.A. 2d, 1944) 145 F. (2d) 568, and reaffirming 2 T.C. 853 (1943).
26
(C.C.A. 2d, 1944) 145 F. (2d) 568 at 570, holding that such items are not
deductible when, (I) "incurred merely to prevent the inciden·ce of taxes which
neither affected the yield of investment capital nor its appreciation";· ( 2) "only related
to legal advice in respect to distribution to a legatee, and not to the management of
any property held for the production of income."
27 While the Court was unanimous in the result it reached, it was divided in its
reasoning. The division arose in the question of applicability of the Dobson rule.
The majority thought the problem of statutory interpretation (to determine the meaning of "property held for the production of income") presented a " 'clear cut' question
of law," review of which was not foreclosed by the Dobson decision. A concurring
minority (Justices Frankfurter, Roberts and Jackson) opined that such holding defeated
the doctrine of the Dobson case which, they said "eschewed sterile attempts at differentiation between 'fact' and 'law' in the abstract" and had sought to establish as nonreviewable decisions of the Tax Court on "all matters peculiarly within [its] competence." The minority felt that "the interpretation of tax statutes and their applicaion to the particular circumstances" qualify as such matters and that the decision of
the Tax Court should have been reinstated without independent review.
The effect of the case on the Dobson doctrine has not been authoritatively assessed.
It is, however, difficult to deny the contention asserted by the minority.
28
325 U.S. 365 at 373, 65 S.Ct. 1237 (1945). It will be observed, however, that
though this decision is felt to be within the spirit of Justice Black's dissent in the
McDonald case, its holding is consistent with the majority opinion, relying as it does
on the "management, conservation, or maintenance of property held for the production
of income" clause, rather than on the "for the production or collection of income"
clause.
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to a proper function of the trustee included in his duties of "management" of the trust properties. 29 The expense of contesting a tax
deficiency was held to constitute an expense of "management" of trust
property held for the production of income.30
The factor requisite to satisfy the conservative construction of the
majority of the Court in the McDonald case, but not required by the
liberal construction, is that the non-business expenses must be of such
nature that if they were business expenses they would be deductible. It
is difficult to see how this requisite can be properly sustained. N otwithstanding the ambiguity present in the Senate and House reports,
respecting the parallel constructions of sections 23 (a) (I) and 23 (a)
( 2), the discussion of the I 942 Revenue Bill in the House 81 suggests a
broader intent-an intent consistent with Justice Black's contention that
it was purposed to adjust the deduction provisions to a policy of "taxation on net, not on gross, income [which] has always been the broad
basic policy of our income tax laws." 82
Two fundamental considerations control deductibility under section 23 (a) (2):
29
It may be that the precise tenor of the Bingham case is limited by the emphasis
placed by the Court upon the fact that at the time the expenses in question were incurred, the property was being held for the purpose of winding up the trust. However, Congressional intent was to include not only property which may produce
income in the future, but also property which, although no longer productive to the
taxpayer, has produced income in the past. Similarly, it is to include property held
merely for disposition or to minimize a loss with respect thereto. S. Rep. No. 1631,
77th Cong., 2d sess., p. 87 (1942). Stella Elkins Tyler, 6 T.C. 135 (1946), expresses Tax Court approval of the Regulations statement that "income" includes income
which has been realized in a prior taxable year or may be realized in subsequent taxable
years.
80
Taxpayer's argument that litigation, an unsuccessful prosecution of which
would have subjected income-producing property to a judgment lien, constituted
"conservation" of that property had been previously rejected by the Tax Court in
John W. Willmott, 2 T.C. 321 (1943).
31
Rep. Disney, discussing the bill said, "The bill contains a provision which will
allow taxpayers to deduct expenses incurred for the production or collection of income
whether or not such expenses are connected with the taxpayer's trade or business.
Furthermore, the amendment permits the deduction of expenses incurred for the management, conservation, or maintenance, of property held by the taxpayer for the production of income." 88 CoNG. REc. 6376 (1942). (Italics supplied.)
82
323 U.S. 57 at 66-67, 65 S.Ct. 96 (1944). Professor E. N. Griswold, in a
note at 56 HARV. L. REv. II42 (1943) dealing with the construction of deduction
provisions generally, says, at p. 1144-1145, " •.. there is no need .•. to deny that
Congress has very great power over the deductions which are allowed. The fact remains that Congress htJS never sought to tax gross income. We are not dealing with
a question of power, but of intention. And the whole structure and the history of the
income tax makes it plain that the intention of Congress to allow deductions has been
just as clear as its intention to tax income."
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First, Is the item an expense, as distinguished from a capital
expenditure?
Second, Is the expense incurred in the production or collection of
income or in the management, conservation, or maintenance of property held for the production of income as distinguished from a personal
expense?
The cleavage between the conservative and liberal constructions is
not in regard to whether capital expenditures are deductible, for even
the most ardent exponents of the liberal view would not contend that
the purchase price, for instance, of securities should be deductible as an
expense item. Instead, the dispute has to do with the definition of capital expenditures and more particularly with the question whether the
definition of expenses adopted for section 2 3 (a) (I) is to be applied for_
section 23(a)(2).38 The leading case arising on this po_int under section 23(a)(2) is Bowers v. Lumpkin 84 involving the deductibility of
expenses incurred by the taxpayer in connection with litigation to defend against suit brought by the Attorney General of South Carolina in
which the latter sought unsuccessfully to invalic;late taxpayer's title to
stock purchased by her from trustees of a fund set up by her former
husband. The circuit court disallowed the deductions on the ground
that Congressional intent in enacting section 121 of the 1942 Act was
confined to mitigation of the harshness of the Higgins case and thus
items classed as capital expenditures under section 23 (a) (I) must be
similarly treated under section 23(a)(2).85 Accordingly such items
were to be treated as part of the cost of the stock for determination of
gain or loss when subsequently sold.86
88
The question of the distinction between capital expenditures and business
expense items is discussed in 4 MERTENS, LAw OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION,
§ 25.17 (1942).
34
(C.C.A. 4th, 1944) 140 F. (2d) 927, 31 A.F. T.R. 201, reversing (D.C.
S.C. 1943) 50 F. Supp. 874, cert. den., 322 U.S. 755, 64 S.Ct. 1266 (1944). See
note 40, infra. For an earlier case see J. H. Walker, T.C. Dkt. II2026; 1943 P-H
MEMO. DEc., 1f 43,524, a:ffd., (C.C.A. 6th, 1944) 145 F. (2d) 602, 33 A.F.T.R. 86.
35
'
The Court bas_ed its holding on portions of TREAS. REG. 1 II, §29.23 (a)15(b), supra, note 15 (as part of the former TREAS. REG. 103, as amended). The
question remains whether the Regulations are consistent with Congressional intent.
In Cynthia Kuser Herbst, T.C. Dkt. 109224, 1943 P-H MEMO. DEc., 1f 43,309,
the Tax Court distinguished several types of legal fees as deductible expenses and
capital expenditures.
36
The Lumpkin case was followed in Coughlin v. Commissioner, 3 T.C. 420
(1944), involving expenses of litigation challenging petitioner's title to stocks and
other properties claimed by the adversary to be rightfully part of the estate of the
mother of the parties, of which estate the petitioner was administrator. See also, note
40, infra.
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Six days after the Lumpkin decision, the Tax Court rendered its
decision in the case of Margery K. Megargel, and allowed deductions
of fees and expenses incurred by a taxpayer whose suit to recover stock
previously transferred had been settled by payment to the taxpayer of
a sum considered by the court to be of the nature of capital gain from
the sale of stock. 37 The decision was based on a portion of section
29.23(a)-r5 of Regulations rrr, 38 and was acquiesced in by the commissioner. The writer's search has disclosed no judicial attempt to
reconcile these two decisions, and the Megargel case may be regarded
as the taJisman of the liberal application.
Bearing in mind that the Lumpkin case is based on the restricted
purpose of section r2r of the act of 1942, as enunciated in the majority opinion of the McDonald case, it may be found to have been weakened by the relative liberality of the Bingham case.39 For the present,
the Lumpkin doctrine appears to have commanded a respectable following40 and the issue is regarded by Mr. Mertens as more or less
37
Margery K. Megargel, 3 T.C. 238 (1944). See also, Walter S. Heller, 2
T.C. 371 (1943), affd., (C.C.A. 9th, 1945) 147 F. (2d) 376, cert. den., 325 U.S.
868, 65 S.Ct. 1405 (1945).
38
"The term 'income' for the purpose of Section 23(a) (2) comprehends not
merely income of the taxable year but also income which the taxpayer has realized in
a prior taxable year or may realize in subsequent taxable years; and is not confined to
recurring income but applies as well to gains from the disposition of property. For
example, if defaulted bonds, the interest from which if received would be includible
in income, are purchased with the expectation of realizing capital gain on their resale,
even though no current yield thereon is anticipated, ordinary and necessary expenses
thereafter incurred in connection therewith are deductible. • .•"
39
Holding contra, at least as to expense of attorney's fees incurred in proceedings
to challenge a will, where in settlement of the proceeding the taxpayer received from
the estate certain notes and cash, B. M. Spears, T.C. Dkt. 11731, 1947 P-H MEMO.
DEc., U47,071.
40 Helvering v. Stormfeltz, (C.C.A. 8th, 1944) 142 F. (2d) 982. (Ward who
recovered judgment against his guardian for money embezzled was allowed to deduct
that portion of the legal expenses allocable to recovery of interest, but not allowed to
deduct the portion allocable to recovery of capital. The unliquidated claim was
denied recognition as "property held for the production of income.") This is consistent with TREAs. REG. I I 1, § 29.23 (a)-15. Accord, Edmunds v. United States,
(D.C. Mo. 1947) 71 F. Supp. 29. Don A. Davis v. Commissioner, 4 T.C. 329
(1944) {selling commissions paid in connection with the disposition of securities by
one not a dealer in securities held not deductible as expenses but must be treated as
offsets against selling price in determining the gain or loss ·incident to the disposition
of the property). Affirmed, (C.C.A. 8th, 1945) 151 F. (2d) 441 at 443: "The
selling expenses which the petitioner sought to deduct, had they been paid or incurred
in carrying on a business, would not have been deductible from gross income under
§ 23(a)(1)(A), as 'ordinary and necessary expenses,' but would have constituted
deductions from the proceeds of sale .••• We agree with the Tax Court that Congress
did not intend to permit an individual to deduct from gross income, as ordinary and
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settled.41 Yet, the Tax Court's decision in the Megargel case is not without support. In Walter S. Heller,4 2 attorneys' fees paid by~ taxpayer
in his litigation-as dissenting stockholder to recover under a California
statute the cash value of his stock i; a corporation merged with another
corporation were held deductible. The Tax Court found it ''obvious
that Congress intended that some expenditures pertaining to assets of
a purely capital nature were to be allowed· as deductions from gross
income" because of the Congressional definition of income to include
gain from the disposition of property as well as recurring income.43
It must not be overlooked, however, that both the Megargel and
Heller cases were resolved on grounds other tha:n that the suit was
brought to recover or perfect title. 44
necessary expenses, under § 23(a)(2), selling costs of a kind which would not be
deductible as business expenses under § 23(a)(1)(A)." Cert. den., 327 U.S. 783, 66
S.Ct. 682 (1946). Coughlin v. Commissioner, 3 T.C. 420 (1944), see note 36, supra;
Ernest Smith, T.C. Dkt. 7097, 1946 P-H MEMO. DEc., 1f 46,009; B. M. Spears,
T.C. Dkt. 11731, 1947 P-H MEMO, DEc., 1f 47,071. For an early prognosis _that
the Lumpkin doctrine would prevail, see Schwanbeck, "Non-Trade and Non-Business
Deductions," 22 TAXES 466 (1944).
41
4 MERTENS, I.Aw OF FEDERAL lNcoME TAXATION, § 25,120, p. 290 (1947
Supp.): " •.• Was it the intention, in connection with the 1942 change, notably by
reference to expenses in the 'conservation' of property held for the production of
income, to permit deductions for expenditures of the type which would formerly have
been considered 'capital expenditures' rather than deductible expenses? There was
some controversy concerning this for a time; though it appeared to be quite clear from
the committee reports on the measure and the general purpose of the amendment that
Congress had no such intention. That it did not, and that such expenditures remain
non-deductible as current expenses, has since been established by decision of one of
the Circuit Courts of Appeals [ citing Bowers v. Lumpkin]."
42
2 T.C. 371 (1943), affd., (C.C.A. 9th, 1945) 147 F. (2d) 376; cert. den.,
325 U.S. 868, 65 S.Ct. 1405 (1945).
43
Also, James H. Knox Trust, 4 T.C. 258 (1944). The entire amount of commission paid to trustees of a testamentary trust for receiving and paying out trust
assets was held deductible from gross income of the trust under § 23(a)(2) though
they had been paid from the corpus of the trust. It was so held against the contention
that the commissions were paid "for the mere act of receiving the trust corp'us" and
that they were therefore capital expenditures and not ordinary and necessary expenses.
The Court found that they were paid "for the services performed or to be performed
by the trustees in the maintenance and conservation of the trust assets." Id. at 265.
44
Add to these cases the subsequent case of Bartholomew v. Commissioner, 4 T.C.
349 (1944), appeal dismissed, (C.C.A. 9th, 1945) 151 F. (2d) 534, where the
court allowed deduction· of expenses of litigation brought to defend from his parents
.the estate of a child actor. Though admitting that "the litigation sought to strip him
of his property," the court distinguished this from "recovery of capital" or "defense
of property."
T.D. 5513, 1946 INT. REv. BuL. 61, approved May 14, 1946, amending TREAS.
REG. III,§ 29.23(a)-15, includes what appears to be an incorporation of the Bartholomew ruling: "Reasonable amounts paid or incurred for the services of a guardian or

I.R.C.

SECTION

23(A) (2)

1027

The history of a still more recent case 45 has suggested a tendency
toward liberality without an overruling of the Lumpkin case. The
petitioner was an officer of a corporation whose stockholders had
brought suit against him for alleged breach of fiduciary duties in connection with the organization of an associated syndicate. The stockholders sought to have the stock held by petitioner in the syndicate
impressed with a trust for the benefit of the corporation. In disallowing
the deduction of expenses of the suit, the Tax Court held that defense
of litigation attacking the taxpayer's title to property was an "expenditure capital in its nature [which] becomes part of the basis." Citing
Bowers v. Lumpkin, ap.d James C. Coughlin, as authority, the Court
said:
"And we can not agree that the effect of the Bingham case
was to discredit or overrule these authorities .... The test accordingly seems to us to be whether prior to the amendment such a
deduction as that now in controversy would have been permitted
to a taxpayer admittedly engaged in carrying on a trade or busi- ness." 46
On appeal, the circuit court reversed the Tax Court and allowed
the deduction on the theory that the expenses were actually incurred
in a defense of the charge that the petitioner had breached his fiduciary
duties, and that the fees were not "any the less deductible because his
liability, if proved, might have destroyed his equitable title to the stock
he held." It must, however, be conceded that the effect of this appellate
decision may be negligible insofar as section 23 (a) ( 2) is concerned,
because the circuit court apparently regarded the expenses as "business"
expense, allowable under section 23 (a) (I) (A).
To date, it appears that the protagonists of a liberal interpretation,
as expressed by Justice Black's McDonald dissent, are supported by the
wording of section 23(a)(2), by logic, yea, by all authority except the
courts.
committee for a ward or minor, and other expenses of guardians and committees which
are ordinary and necessary, in connection with the production or collection of income
inuring to the ward or minor, or in connection with the management, conservation,
or maintenance of property, held for the production of income, belonging to the ward
or minor, are deductible." Applying the amended regulation, see note 46, infra ••
45
Harold K. Hochschild, 7 T.C. 81 (1946).
46
Id. at 87. Kohnstamm v. Pedrick, (D.C. N.Y. 1946) 66 F. Supp. 410, which
allows as deductible within the Bingham definition of "management," expenses of
litigation brought by an incompetent's committee to obtain instructions as to whether
the committee should elect, on behalf of the ward, to take his share, as in intestacy, of
his deceased wife's estate.
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The second fundamental consideration is that of distinguishing expenses which are merely personal and hence non-deductible. 47 This
distinction survives from earlier acts. Clearly, expenses incurred in
maintaining property as a "sport, hobby or recreation" are not deductible. 48 Likewise, certain specific expenses are listed by Regulations I I I as being non-deductible:
"Commuter's expenses; 49 expenses of taking special courses or
training; expenses for improving personal appearance; the cost of
rental of a safe-deposit box for storing jewelry and other personal
e:ffects; 50 and expenses such as expenses in seeking employment
or in placing oneself in a position to begin rendering personal
services for compensation, 51 campaign expenses of a candidate for
47

"Sec. 24(a) General Rule.-In computing net income no deduction shall in any
case be allowed in respect of( I) Personal, living, or family expenses, except extraordinary medical expenses
deductible under section 23(x): ••.•"
This section was amended so to read by § 127(b), Revenue Act of 1942, 56
Stat. L. 826, which added the clause excepting "extraordinary medical expenses."
Mildred A. O'Connor, 6 T.C. 323 (1946) (cost of hiring a nursemaid to care forinfant children of petitioner and husband, both of whom were employed, and to assist petitioner in discharge of household duties, held, personal expenses.)
48
H.R. Rep. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d sess., p. 75 (1942). S. Rep. 1631, 77th
Cong., 2d sess., p. 88 (1942), TREAS. REG. 111, § 29.23(a)-15(b): "The question
whether or not a transaction is carried on primarily fo_r the production of income or
for the management, conservation or maintenance of property held for the production
or collection of income, rather than primarily as a sport, hobby, or recreation, is not
to be determined solely from the intention of the taxpayer but rather from all the circumstances of the case, including the record of prior gain or loss of the taxpayer in the
activity, the relation between the type of activity and the principal occupation of the
taxpayer and the uses to which the property or what it produces is put by the taxpayer." Disallowing the deduction: R.C. Coffey, I T.C. 579, affd., (C.C.A. 5th,
1944) 141 F. (2d) 204. Allowing the deduction: Norton L. Smith, 9 T.C. 1150
(1947).
49
Commuter's expenses may qualify as business deductions; however, this possibility has been considerably impaired by the highly-controversial case of Commissioner
v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465, 66 S.Ct. 250 (1946), rehearing den., 326 U.S. 812, 66 S.Ct.
482 (1946). Taxpayer's expenses for running his automobile' are deductible under
§ 23(a)(1) in the proportion he uses it as required by his business. The balance is
non-deductible, it being a personal expense. Hubbart v. Commissioner, 4 T.C. 121
(1944); Albert Nelson, 6 T.C. 764 (1946); Lewis F. Jacobson, 6 T.C. 1048 (1946).
50 Rental of safe-deposit box for keeping of income producing securities is, however, deductible. W. N. Fry, 5 T.C. 1058 (1945); Albina Bodell, T.C. Dkt. 109651,
1943 P-H MEMO. DEc., 1f 43,015.
51
It is difficult to understand how this denial would withstand analysis. "Expenses
incurred in seeking or taking up a new job," says Mr. Mertens, "are non-deductible
( as trade or business deductions under § 2 3 (a)( I)] since they are not incurred away
from home and possibly for the further reason that they are not in the- pursuit of
an established trade or business. . . ." 4 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX-
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public office, bar examination fees and other expenses incurred in
securing admission to the bar, and corresponding fees and expenses incurred by physicians, dentists, accountants, and other
taxpayers for .securing the right to practice their respective professions." G2
A surprising number of cases have already been decided on the
issue of the nature of the expense as personal or for the production of
income. They show no well-defined line of distinction. In connection
with the allowance of deduction of legal and accounting fees arising
from tax controversies, the trend suggests liberality. The Regulations
purported to disallow such expenses/3 and early cases were in accord.
In "John W. Willmott/¾ the taxpayer's expenses for litigation arising
from the commissioner's disallowance of deductions of income from
securities and realty claimed by taxpayer to have been conveyed to his
wife and son were held non-deductible under section 23 (a) ( 2), despite
§ 25.83, p. 478 (1942). These reasons would seem insufficient to justify disallowance under§ 23(a) (2). Furthermore, in the hypothetical case of A, a prospective
employer, who has reimbursed B, a prospective employee, for B's expenses incurred in
traveling to A's place of business for a personal interview, it would seem manifestly
unfair to permit A to deduct the cost of reimbursement as a "business expense" and
to deny deduction to B.
2
G TREAS. REG. III, § 29.23(a)-15(b).
Gs TREAS. REG. II 1, § 29.23(a)-15(b): "Expenditures incurred for the purpose
of preparing tax returns ( except to the extent such returns relate to taxes on property
held for the production of income), for the purpose of recovering taxes ( other than
recoveries required to be included in income), or for the purpose of resisting a proposed
additional assessment of taxes (other than taxes held for the production of income)
are not deductible expenses under this section, except that part of which the taxpayer
clearly shows to be properly allocable to the recovery of interest required to be included in income." By T.D. 5513, Approved May 14, 1946, this portion of the
regulation was changed to read: "Expenses paid or incurred by an individual in the
determination of liability for taxes upon his income are deductible. If property is
held by an individual for the production of income, amounts expended in determining
a property tax imposed with respect to such property during the period when so held
are deductible. Expenses paid or incurred by an individual in determining or contesting
any liability asserted against him do not become deductible, however, by reason of the
fact that property held by him for the production of income may be required to be
used or sold for the purpose of satisfying such liability. Thus, expenses, paid or
incurred by an individual in the determination of gift tax liability except to the
extent that such expenses are allocable to interest on a refund of gift taxes, are not
deductible, even though property held by him for the production of income must be
sold to satisfy an assessment for such tax liability or even though, in the event of a
claim for refund, the amount received will be held by him for the production of
income."
5
¾ 2 T.C. 321 (1943). Accord, Edward Peterson, T.C. Dkt. 110005, 1945
P-H MEMO. DEc., ~ 45,130, in which expenses of attorneys' fees incurred by taxpayer
in protesting assessment of his profits from a partnership were held non-deductible.
ATION,
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the contention that, had the matter not been litigated, half the property would have been subject to a judgment lien. This was held not
to be "conservation" within the meaning of the act. 55 Development
since the Willmott case is illustrated in the history of the Stoddard case.
In March, I 944, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
affirmed 56 a disalkiwance of deduction of fees paid in 1936 to accountants for services in helping the taxpayer successfully to contest
the payment of taxes assessed against him by the commissioner in
previous years. After quoting section 23 (a) ( 2), the Court said,
"To extend this language to make it possible for taxpayers to
deduct not only expenses which resulted, or were intended to result, in the acquisition of taxable income but also the expense of
litigation over the amount of their income taxes would be too great
a stretch in the absence of anything to indicate that Congress intended so to encourage litigation." 57
The following year brought the Bingham case, on the basis of which
the circuit court reversed its previous holding in the Stoddard cas,e.58
Subsequent cases in accord 59 lead to the suggestion that legal expenses
55

It has been held that expenses incurred in the recovery of taxes were deductible
in the proportion that represented recovery of interest, but not recovery of overpayments. P. E. Foerderer, T.C. Dkt. 109076, 1943 P-H MEMO. DEc., 1f 43,102,
a.ffd., (C.C.A. 3d, 1944) 141 F. (2d) 53. James McFaddin, 2 T.C. 395 (1943).
That the bureau persists in refusing to recognize an impending lien as an element
ascribing to litigation the character of conservation, see text to note 57, infra.
56
,
(C.C.A. 2d, 1944) 141 F. (2d} 76.
57
Id. at 80. Cf. Hord v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 6th, 1944) 143 F. (2d) 73,
wherein similar fees were disallowed, but the opinion implies an alternative ground of
insufficient evidence.
58
Stoddard v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 2d, 1945) 152 F. (2d) 445.
69
Howard E. Cammack, 5 T.C. 467'(1945) (litigation to recover a claimed tax
deduction for loss on stock which became worthless in 1932. The Tax Court found this
to be connected with "management"}. Herbert Marshall, 5 T.C. 1032 (1945)
(litigation contesting commissioner's disallowance of taxpayer's right to report his
income divided as community property}. Williams v. McGowan, (C.C.A. 2d, 1945)
152 F. (2d) 570 (litigation in 1940 to secure refund of taxes paid for the years 1936
and 1937). Philip D. Armour, 6 T.C. 359 (1946) (litigation over personal holding
company surtax deficiencies for which taxpayer was liable as transferee}. William P.
Toms, T.C. Dkt. 7417, 1946 P-H MEMO. DEc., 1f 46,062. (Petitioner, whose
principal source of income arose from ownership of corporation stock, incurred expenses in litigation in which he was sued for alleged breach of contract for the sale
thereof. The expenses were held deductible under the Bingham doctrine.) James A.
Connelly, 6 T.C. 744 (1946). (Litigation on a contested deficiency due to disallowance of a stock loss held deductible on authority of Cammack case. The fact that
taxpayer was unsuccessful in his litigation is immaterial.} Dunitz v. Commissioner,
7 T.C. 672 ( I 946} ( expenses of successful defense of proposed assessment for alleged
realization of taxable income by reason of purchase of bonds at discount held de-
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in all tax controversies are deductible, whether or not the disputed
taxes relate to property held for the production of income.
For a period, it was not so clear that either expenses of tax advice,
as distinguished from expenses of litigation, or accounting and bookkeeping fees, are regularly deductible.60 But, there appears no reason
in logic or principle to discriminate against such expenses in favor of
litigation fees. Though they are not incurred so directly for "conservation" or "management," they appear to be no less a proper expense
in the determination of taxes. Admitting the theory of taxing only net
income, these expenses would seem to be within the purpose of section
121.61 More recent decisions have recognized these deductions. Also,
Regulations III, section 29.23(a)-15(b) has been amended 62 to provide that
"Expenses paid or incurred by an individual in the determination of liability for_ taxes upon his income are deductible."
The recent case of David L. Loew,63 concerned fees paid to accountants for preparation of income tax returns, also fees paid for
keeping books on petitioner's securities and depositing in his bank
account dividends received. All such expenses were held deductible
under the Bingham doctrine since they were directly connected with
ductible). Pelham G. Wodehouse, 8 T.C. 637 (1947). See note 53, supra, for change
in the pertinent Regulation.
60
Myrhl Frost, T.C. Dkt. n2333, 1943 P-H MEMO. DEc., 1f 43,155, allowed
the deductions of amounts paid to a public accountant for services rendered in connection with the keeping of books respecting income collected from real estate and
for preparation of income tax returns. There followed Aldus C. Higgins, 2 T.C. 948
(1943), affd., (C.C.A. 1st, 1944) 143 F. (2d) 654; J.S. Floyd, T.C. Dkt. 112513,
1943 P-H MEMo. DEc., 1f 43,421; Frank G. Hogan, 3 T.C. 691 (1944);
Hord v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 6th, 1944) 143 F. (2d) 73; Davis v. Commissioner,
4 T.C. 329 (1944), affd., (C.C.A. 8th, 1945) 151 F. (2d) 441, where such expenses
were disallowed. But, see David L. Loew, 7 T.C. 363 (1946), infra.
61
William Heyman, 6 T.C. 799 (1946). Fees for accountants' services in conferences and consultations with representatives of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, as
a result of which petitioner paid additional taxes, held, deductible. The court was
divided on the point of whether such fees, to be deductible, need be connected with
taxes on property held for income.
62
T.D. 5513, 1946 INT. REv. BuL. 61, approved May 14, 1946. A letter of
Joseph D. Nunan, Jr., Commissioner, dated June 11, 1946, construes this as providing
that, " ••• feei paid by an individual taxpayer for the preparation of his individual tax
returns involving salary income only are deductible. • • ." 464 C.C.H. STAND. FED.
TAX SERV., 1f 6215.
68
7 T.C. 363 (1946). The Court treats R.C. Coffey, James McFaddin, 2 T.C.
395 (1943); Aldus C. Higgins, 2 T.C. 948 (1943); Stoddard v. Commissioner,
(C.C.A. 2d, 1945) 152 F. (2d) 445 (first case); and Hord v. Commissioner, (C.C.A.
6th, 1944) 143 F. (2d) 73, as overruled by the Bingham case.
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'or

proximately resulted from the enterprise-"the management of
property" held for the production of income.
The question of whether the standards distinguishing personal expenses and business expenses under section 23 (a) (I) are to be adopted
for application of section 23(a)(2) was in issue in the case of Warren
Leslie, Sr. 64 In disallowing expenses of a caretaker on property which
had formerly been a residence, a majority of the Tax Court held the
problem comparable to that involved when a loss is sustained on the
sale of former residential property. This imposed on the taxpayer the
burden of proving "some unmistakable act of conversion or appropriation" to income-producing purposes. 65 The minority, on the other
hand, respected the liberal purpose of section I2I. The minority contended that in order to satisfy section 23 (a) ( 2), it is necessary only
to show· that the property is not carried as "a sport, hobby or recreation." 66 This satisfied, the expenses for residential property became
important only as prohibited by section 24( a) (I) as "personal expenses." 67 Denying the propriety of closely following the construction of section 23 (a) (I), the dissent says,
64
6 T.C. 488 (1946). Petitioners, husband and decedent wife, on a joint return,
claimed deduction for loss and caretaker's expenses on property which had been so
badly damaged by a hurricane in 1938 that it could not be occupied thereafter without
extensive repairs. They decided not to occupy it again. Repairs were never made
and petitioners made no attempt to rent; though they did grant to a realtor the right
to try to sell the property, no sale ever resulted. The property was conveyed to a
mortgagee in I 940, at an alleged loss of thirty-three thousand dollars. A caretaker
had been employed on the property during the interval. Loss resulting from disposition of the property in 1940 was disallowed as resulting from disposition of residential
property [§ 23(e)(2)].
65
The majority distinguished Mary L. Robinson, 2 T.C. 305 (1943), (in which
there was shown a sufficient act of conversion of the former residence). Cf. Guggenheimer, T.C. Dkt. III821, 1943 P-H MEMO. DEc., 1f 43,432 (no clear evidence of
conversion); S. Wise, T.C. Dkt. 5721, 1945 P-H MEMO. DEc., 1f 45,298 (expenses
of advertising for sale a residence taxpayer had occupied during the year, before he
moved to a newly built residence, held, non-deductible) ; Thora Scott Ronalds, T.C.
Dkt. 2384, 1946 P-H MEMO. DEc., 1f 46,224; George W. Ritter, T.C. Dkt. 9096,
1946 :P-H MEMo. DEc., 1f 46,237.
116
H.R. Rep. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d sess., p. 75 (1942), S. Rep. 1631, 77th
Cong., 2d sess., p. 88 (1942). TREAS. REG. III,§ 29.23(a)-15. R. C. Coffey, I T.C.
579 (1943), affd., (C.C.A. 5th, 1944) 141 F. (2d) 204, denied deduction of
expenses in operating a small citrus grove located on the same premises with taxpayer's •
residence.
61
6 T.C. 488 at 497: "The whole history of this question convinces me that
nothing need be shown except a change from a residence status to a non-residence status,
for the passage of the Act of I 942 is proof enough that conversion to a business property
is not requisite, and if so (and the property is not mere hobby, which is nowhere
suggested in this case, but negatived by the former residence feature), then all that
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"I think section r 2 r of the Revenue Act of r 942 was definitely
intended to do away with any comparison with losses, and that
we should view the matter only to inquire whether property is
'held for the production of income,' and not set up requirements
based on losses, or the former statute, or analogy thereto. Conversion or appropriation, though necessary to change a residence
to business property, is logically unnecessary to divest it of a
personal character. If such test is still requisite, the statute seems
to have accomplished little, if anything." 68
That the liberal philosoph_y of the minority is not likely to be
adopted is indicated by cases involving a different, but very interesting,
question. In Julius A. Heide,6 9 petitioner was one of four co-trustees
. who commenced proceedings for an intermediate accounting. The
proceedings eventually culminated in a final accounting. Remaindermen and special guardians for infants and incompetents objected to the
accounts, charging mismanagement ( no bad faith_ was charged) of the
subject trusts. Protracted litigation threatened. To settle the matter,
the parties stipulated, inter alia, that the trustees should each be charged
$3,000, payable in equal portions to the trusts. The Tax Court allowed
under section 23(a)(2) petitioner's deduction of the $3,000 he paid.
A three-judge minority dissented on the ground that, notwithstanding
petitioner agreed as part of the settlement to waive compensation for
his services, the surcharge was not related to the question of petitioner's
compensation as trustee. Hence, reasoned the minority, the sum paid
was not an expense incurred in the production or collection of income.
On appeal, 70 the circuit court reversed, disallowing the deduction on
the ground that the expense.was not "ordinary and necessary." To be
the residence idea adds is the provision of § 24(a) (1)." A. D. Amerise, I T.C.
II08 (1943), held that the petitioner who had leased his residence and temporarily
rented other quarters for himself and family was not entitled to deduct that rental cost.
It continued as a family living expense.
68
6 T.C. 488 at 497-498. That the matter is not yet settled to the satisfaction
of the entire court is suggested by the dissent's last words (p. 499), "I regret the
length of this dissent, but I feel that this is the crucial stage in an important subject."
It is interesting to note that Disney, J., who wrote the dissent, wrote the majority
opinion in Harman v. Commissioner, 4 T.C. 335 (1944), wherein fees paid to one
for services in negotiating a loan were held to be capital expenditures and not deductible, on the authority of two earlier cases distinguishing business expenses from
capital expenditures.
69
8 T.C. 314 (1947). To the effect that the Tax Court may be impressed by
whether and when the taxpayer waives right to administrator's compensation in a
case of this kind. Cf. Hyman Y. Josephs, 8 T.C. 583 (1947), appeals pending,
C.C.A. 8th.
7
°Commissioner v. Heide, (C.C.A. 2d, 1948) 165 F. (2d) 699.
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deductible, the surcharge paid must be one to reimburse for a depletion
which was itself necessary to administration of the trust, else Congress
would be found to have provided a means to "subsidize delinquent
trustees."
Miscellaneous expenses incurred in connection with the production
of income or the management, conservation or maintenance of property held for that purpose are deductible. These include expenditures
for rent, telephone, maintenance of an office (including an allowance
for depreciation of office furniture), 71 secretarial service,72 safe-deposit
box rental, 78 travel to look after property held ~or income,74 and attorneys' fees paid by a writer to look after the taxpayer's literary interests. 75 But, always the burden is on the taxpayer to show that Jiis
claimed deduction falls clearly within the deductions provided for by
statute. 76 If expenses are incurred for purposes which would qualify
·only a part thereof as deductible, the taxpayer bears the burden of
proving which portion is deductible at the risk of losing all.11
One general rule, elementary in statement, warrants comment by
reason of the interesting questions anticipated in future cases within
its purview. In order to qualify under section 23(a)(2) the expense
must be incurred in relation to the income of the taxpayer seeking the
deduction. Where the taxpayer was a minority owner of two corporations and provided the corporations with the services of experienced
employees, the salaries paid by the taxpayer to the employees were
held non-deductible. It was assumed by the court that the presence
of the employees enhanced the corporations' chances of success. The
Edward G. Acheson, T.C. Dkt. 109620, 1943 P-H MEMO. DEc., 1f 43,163.
Rentschler v. Commissioner, l T.C. 814 (1943).
78
Albina Bodell, T.C. Dkt. 109651, 1943 P-H MEMO. DEc., 1f 43,015;
W. N. Fry, 5 T.C. 1058 (1945).
74
R. C. Coffey, 1 T.C. 579 (1943), affd., (C.C.A. 5th, 1944) 141 F. (2d)
204; E. M. Godson, T.C. Dkt. 4913, 4914, 1946 P-H MEMO. DEc., 1f 46,182.
Harry Kanelas, T.C. Dkt. II2053, 1943 P-H MEMO. DEc., 1f 43,429, allowed
deduction of travel expenses of taxpayer and his attorney for trip to Ireland to
collect sweepstake winnings. Section 2 3 (a) ( l) expressly includes "traveling expenses"
as a business expense; no express mention is made in § 23(a)(2).
75
Pelham G. Wodehouse, 8 T.C. 637 (1947).
76
New Colonial Ice Co., Inc. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435 at 440, 54 S.Ct. 788
(1934); Deputy v. DuPont, 308 U.S. 488 at 493, 60 S.Ct. 363 (1940); Burchenal
v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 6th, 1945) 150 F. (2d) 482 at 485. For a note decrying
the distortion of deduction provisions by constructions imposing_ on the taxpayer an
unreasonable burden of proof, see Professor E. N. Griswold at 56 HARV. L. REv.
1142 (1943).
.
77
Claire S. Strauss, T.C. Dkt. 111094, 1943 P-H MEMO. DEc., 1f 43,216
( l 943) •
71
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deductions were disallowed, however, because the income immediately
benefitted was that of the corporations, and only indirectly was
the income of the taxpayer related. The expenses were not necessary
and ordinary for the taxpayer, at least in the absence of a showing that
the corporations could not provide the services they needed. 78
In no event is a deduction under section 2 3 (a) ( 2) allowed for expenses incurred in the production of income which by reason of some
provision of the code is tax exempt.79
In effect, section 23 (a) ( 2) is applicable to all prior years with the
result that expenses of the required non-trade or non-business character may be claimed as refunds in all cases not barred by the statute of
limitations.80
CONCLUSION

Notwithstanding the probable constitutional power of Congress
to tax gross income, the policy behind the federal program has .been one of taxing net income. For those who anticipated the relatively
recent provision for deduction of non-trade and non-business expenses
as a step toward achieving that end for the individual taxpayer, and
equalizing his position with that of business organization, the cases to
Aldo R. Balsam Trust, T.C. Dkt. 2479, 1944 P-H MEMO. DEc., 1f 44,368.
Accord: W.W. Bercaw, T.C. Dkt. 7263, 1947 P-H MEMO. DEc., 1f 47,005. (Petitioner's expenses incurred in bringing on behalf of his son, unsuccessful litigation for
damages on account of personal injuries, held non-deductible). Charles Dreifus,
T.C. Dkt. 10350, 1947 P-H MEMO. DEc., 1f 47,092.
79
"Sec. 24. ITEMS NoT DEDUCTIBLE. (a) General Rule.-in computing net
income no deduction shall in any case be allowed in respect of- ••• (5) Any amount
otherwise allowable as a deduction which is allocable to one or more classes of income
other than interest (whether or not any amount of income of that class or classes is
received or accrued) wholly exempt from the taxes imposed by this chapter, or any
amount otherwise allowable under § 23 (a)(2) which is allocable to interest
(whether or not any amount of such interest is received or accrued) wholly exempt
from the taxes imposed by this chapter; .•." See Edward Mallinckrodt, Jr., 2 T.C.
n28 (1943), affd., (C.C.A. 8th, 1945) 146 F. (2d) 1, 33 A.F.T.R. 325, cert. den.,
324 U.S. 871, 65 S.Ct. 1084 (1945); Mary K. Ellis, T.C. Dkt. 7176, 1947 P-H
MEMO. DEc., 1f 47,160.
so Revenue Act of 1942. Section 121(d), 56 Stat. L. 819, provides that the
amendments of that section shall be applicable to taxable years beginning after December 31, 1938, § 121(e) further provides that, "For the purposes of the Revenue
Act of 1938 or any prior revenue Act the amendments made to the Internal Revenue
Code by this section shall be effective as if they were a part of such revenue Act on the
date of its enactment." But, these must be read in the light of I.R.C. § 3 22(b). There
appears to be no basis for the ruling in J. Dale Dilworth, T.C. Dkt. 4130, 1945 P-H
MEMO. DEc., 1f 45,271, to the effect that the amendment is inapplicable to the year
1938.
78
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date hold considerable disappointment. The source of the difficulty
appears to lie in
(I) The unfortunate Congressional statement that "a deduction
under this section is subject, except for the requirement of being
incurred in a trade or business, to all the restrictions and limitations that
apply in the case of the deduction under Section 23(a)(r)(a) ...";
and
( 2) Congressional mention that the amendment was motivated by
the holding in the Higgins case.
These have served to ground a restricted interpretation which
blossomed in the McDonald and Lumpkin cases.
Vestiges of these decisions are to be found in recent opinions,
despite the vigorous and persuasive dissent in the McDonald case
and the relatively liberal doctrine of Bingham's Trust v. Commissioner.
It is believed, however, that the latter case will ultimately provide
precedence for judicial recognition that the Congressional remarks
simulating the two sections intended nothing more than that "ordinary
and necessary" expenses of producing income by means other than
through trade or business are deductible even as "ordinary and necessary" expenses of producing income through trade or business are deductible-tha,t Congress was merely indicating that it was correcting
rather than creating a discrimination. It seems even now a not unreasonable hope that the liberal construction will prevail.

